Chapter 10—Monopoly and Competition (continued)

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Chapter
10—Monopoly and Competition
(continued)
D. The Instability of the Cartel
Analysis
demonstrates that a cartel is an inherently unstable form of operation.
If the joint pooling of assets in a common cause proves in the long run
to be profitable for each of the individual members of the cartel, then
they will act formally to merge into one large
firm. The cartel then disappears in the merger. On the other hand, if
the joint action proves unprofitable for one or more members, the
dissatisfied firm or firms will break away from the cartel, and, as we
shall see, any such independent action almost always destroys the
cartel. The cartel form, therefore, is bound to be highly evanescent
and unstable.
If joint
action is the most efficient and profitable course for each member, a
merger will soon take place. The very fact that each member firm
retains its potential independence in the cartel means that a breakup
could take place at any time. The cartel will have to assign production
totals and quotas to each of the member firms. This is likely to lead
first to a good deal of bickering among the firms over the
assignment of quotas, with each member attempting to gain a larger
share of the assignment. Whatever basis quotas are assigned on will
necessarily be arbitrary and will always be subject to
challenge by one or more members.
In a
merger, or in the formation of one corporation, the stockholders, by
majority vote, form a decision-making organization. In the
case of a cartel, however, disputes arise among independent
owning entities.
Particularly likely to be restive under the imposed joint action will
be the more efficient producers, who will be eager to expand their
business rather than be fettered by shackles and quotas to provide
shelter for their less efficient competitors. Clearly, the more
efficient firms will be the ones to break up the cartel. This will be
increasingly true as time goes on and conditions change from the time
the cartel was first formed. The quotas, the jealously made agreements
that formerly seemed plausible to all, now become intolerable
restrictions for the more efficient firms, and the cartel soon breaks
up; for once one firm breaks away, expands output and cuts prices, the
others must follow.
If the
cartel does not break up from within, it is even more likely to do so
from without. To the extent that it has earned unusual monopoly
profits, outside firms and outside producers will enter the same field
of production. Outsiders, in short, rush in to take advantage of the
higher profits. But once one strong competitor arises to challenge it,
the cartel is doomed. For as the firms in the cartel are bound by
production quotas, they must watch new competitors expand and take away
sales from them at an accelerating rate. As a result, the cartel must
break up under the pressure of the newcomers’ competition.
E. Free Competition and Cartels
There are
other arguments that opponents of cartels use in decrying cartel
action. One thesis asserts that there is something wicked about
formerly competing firms now uniting, e.g.,
“restricting competition” or
“restraining trade.” Such restriction is supposed
to injure the consumers’ freedom of choice. As Hutt phrased
it in his previously cited article: “Consumers are free . . .
and consumers’ sovereignty is realizable, only to the extent
to which the power of substitution exists.”
But surely
this is a complete misconception of the meaning of freedom. Crusoe and
Friday bargaining on a desert island have very little range
or power of choice; their power of substitution is
limited. Yet if neither man interferes with the other’s
person or property, each one is absolutely free. To
argue otherwise is to adopt the fallacy of confusing freedom with
abundance or range of choice. No individual producer is or
can be responsible for other people’s power to substitute.
No coffee grower or steel producer, whether acting singly or jointly,
is responsible to anyone because he chose not to produce more.
If Professor X or consumer Y believes that there are not enough coffee
producers in existence or that they are not producing enough, these
critics are free to enter the coffee or steel business as they see fit,
thus increasing both the number of competitors and the quantity of the
good produced.
If
consumer demand had really justified more competitors or more of the
product or a greater variety of products, then entrepreneurs
would have seized the opportunity to profit by satisfying this
demand. The fact that this is not being done in any given case
demonstrates that no such unsatisfied consumer demand exists.
But if this is true, then it follows that no man-made actions
can improve the satisfaction of consumer demand more than is being done
on the unhampered market. The false
confusion of freedom with abundance rests on a failure to
distinguish between the conditions given by nature
and man-made actions to transform nature. In a
state of raw nature, there is no abundance; in fact, there are few, if
any, goods at all. Crusoe is absolutely free,
and yet on the point of starvation. Of course, it would be pleasanter
for everyone if the nature-given conditions had been far more abundant,
but these are vain fantasies. For vis-à-vis nature,
this is the best of all possible
worlds, because it is the only possible one.
Man’s condition on earth is that he must work with the given
natural conditions and improve them by human action. It is a
reflection on nature, not on the free market, that everyone is
“free to starve.”
Economics
demonstrates that individuals, entering into mutual relations in a free
market in a free society—and only in such
relations—can provide abundance for themselves and
for the entire society. (“Free,” as always in this
book, is used in the interpersonal sense of being unmolested
by other persons.) To employ freedom as itself equivalent to abundance
obstructs understanding of these truths.
The free
market in the world of production may be termed “free
competition” or “free entry,” meaning
that in a free society anyone is free to compete and produce in any
field he chooses. “Free competition” is the
application of liberty to the sphere of production: the freedom to buy,
sell, and transform one’s property without violent
interference by an external power.
We have
seen above that in a regime of free competition
consumers’ satisfaction will, at any time, tend to
be at the maximum possible, given natural conditions. The best
forecasters will tend to emerge as the dominant entrepreneurs, and if
anyone sees an opportunity passed up, he is free to take advantage of
his superior foresight. The regime that tends to maximize
consumers’ satisfaction, therefore, is not
“pure competition” or “perfect
competition” or “competition without
cartel action,”or anything other
than one of simple economic liberty.
Some
critics charge that there is no “real” free entry
or free competition in a free market. For how can anyone compete or
enter a field when an enormous amount of money is needed to invest in
efficient plants and firms? It is easy to “enter”
the pushcart peddling “industry” because
so little capital is required, but it is almost impossible to establish
a new automobile firm, with its heavy requirements of capital.
This
argument is but another variant of the prevailing confusion
between freedom and abundance. In this case, the abundance refers to
the money capital which a man has been able to amass. Every man is
perfectly free to become a baseball player; but this freedom does not
imply that he will be as good a baseball player as the next man. A
man’s range or power of action, dependent on his ability and
the exchange-value of his property, is something completely
distinct from his freedom. As we have said, a free society will in the
long run lead to general abundance and is the necessary condition for
that abundance. But the two must be kept conceptually distinct, and not
confused by phrases such as “real freedom” or
“true freedom.” Therefore, the fact that everyone
is free to enter an industry does not mean that
everyone is able, either in terms of
personal qualities or monetary capital, to do so. In industries
requiring more capital, fewer people will be able to take
advantage of their freedom to set up a new firm than in those requiring
less capital, just as fewer laborers will be able to take
advantage of freedom of entry in a very highly skilled profession than
in a menial position. There is no mystery about either situation.
In fact,
the disability is much more relevant in the case of labor than
in the case of business competition. What are modern devices such as
corporations but means of pooling capital by many people of greater and
lesser wealth? The “difficulty” of investing in a
new automobile firm should be considered, not in terms of the hundreds
of millions of dollars required for total investment, but in terms of
the 50 or so dollars required to purchase one share of stock. But while
capital can be pooled, beginning with the smallest units, labor ability
cannot be pooled.
Sometimes
the argument reaches absurd lengths. For example, it is often asserted
that now, in this modern world, firms are so large that new people
“cannot” compete or enter the industry because the
capital cannot be raised. These critics do not seem to see that the
aggregate capital and wealth of individuals have advanced along with
the increase in wealth required to launch a new enterprise. In fact,
these are two sides of the same coin. There is no reason to suppose
that it was easier to raise the capital to launch a new retail
shop many centuries ago than it is to raise capital for the automobile
firm today. If there is enough capital to finance the large firms
currently existing, there is enough to finance one more; in fact,
capital could be withdrawn from existing large firms and shifted to new
ones if there is a need for them. Of course, if the new enterprise
would be unprofitable and therefore unserviceable to
consumers, it is easy to see why there is reluctance in the free market
to embark on the venture.
That there
is inequality of ability or monetary income on the free market should
surprise no one. As we have seen above, men are not
“equal” in their tastes, interests, abilities, or
locations. Resources are not distributed “equally”
over the earth.
This
inequality or diversity in abilities and distribution of
resources insures inequality of income on the free market.
And, since a man’s monetary assets are derived from his and
his ancestors’ abilities in serving consumers on the market,
it is not surprising that there is inequality of monetary wealth
as well.
The term
“free competition,” then, will prove misleading
unless it is interpreted to mean free action, i.e., freedom to
compete or not to compete as the individual wills.
It should
be clear from the foregoing discussion that there is nothing
particularly reprehensible or destructive of consumer freedom in the
establishment of a “monopoly price” or in a cartel
action. A cartel action, if it is a voluntary one, cannot injure
freedom of competition and, if it proves profitable, benefits
rather than injures the consumers. It is perfectly consonant with a
free society, with individual self-sovereignty, and with the earning of
money through serving consumers.
As
Benjamin R. Tucker brilliantly concluded in dealing with the problem of
cartels and competition:
That the right to cooperate is as unquestionable as
the right to compete; the right to compete involves the right to
refrain from competition; cooperation is often a method of competition,
and competition is always, in the larger view, a method of cooperation
. . . each is a legitimate, orderly, non-invasive exercise of the
individual will under the social law of equal liberty . . .
Viewed in the light of these irrefutable
propositions, the trust, then, like every other industrial combination
endeavoring to do collectively nothing but what each member of the
combination might fully endeavor to do individually, is, per
se, an unimpeachable institution. To assail or control or
deny this form of cooperation on the ground that it is itself a denial
of competition is an absurdity. It is an absurdity, because it
proves too much. The trust is a denial of
competition in no other sense than that in which competition
itself is a denial of competition. (Italics ours.) The trust
denies competition only by producing and selling more cheaply than
those outside of the trust can produce and sell; but in that sense
every successful individual competitor also denies
competition. . . . The fact is that there is one denial of competition
which is the right of all, and that there is another denial of
competition which is the right of none. All of us, whether out of a
trust or in it, have a right to deny competition by competing, but none
of us, whether in a trust or out of it, have a right to deny
competition by arbitrary decree, by interference with voluntary effort,
by forcible suppression of initiative.
This is
not to say, of course, that joint co-operation or combination
is necessarily “better than” competition among
firms. We simply conclude that the relative extent of areas within
or between firms on the free market will be
precisely that proportion most conducive to the well-being of
consumers and producers alike. This is the same as our previous
conclusion that the size of a firm will tend to be established at the
level most serviceable to the consumers.
F. The Problem of One Big Cartel
The myth
of the evil cartel has been greatly bolstered by the nightmare image of
“one big cartel.” “This is all very
well,” one may say, “but suppose that all the firms
in the country amalgamated or cartelized into One Big Cartel.
What of the horrors then?”
The answer
can be obtained by referring to chapter 9, pp. 612ff above, where we
saw that the free market placed definite limits on the size of the
firm, i.e., the limits of calculability on the
market. In order to calculate the profits and losses of each
branch, a firm must be able to refer its internal operations to external
markets for each of the various factors
and intermediate products. When any of these external markets
disappears, because all are absorbed within the
province of a single firm, calculability disappears, and there is no
way for the firm rationally to allocate factors to that specific area.
The more these limits are encroached upon, the greater and greater will
be the sphere of irrationality, and the more difficult it will be to
avoid losses. One big cartel would not be able rationally to allocate
producers’ goods at all and hence could not avoid severe
losses. Consequently, it could never really be established, and, if
tried, would quickly break asunder.
In the
production sphere, socialism is equivalent to One Big Cartel,
compulsorily organized and controlled by the State.Those who advocate
socialist “central planning” as the more
efficient method of production for consumer wants must answer
the question: If this central planning is really more efficient, why
has it not been established by profit-seeking individuals on the free
market? The fact that One Big Cartel has never been formed voluntarily
and that it needs the coercive might of the State to be formed
demonstrates that it could not possibly be the most efficient method of
satisfying consumer desires.
Let us
assume for a moment that One Big Cartel could be established on the
free market and that the calculability problem does not arise.
What would the economic consequences be? Would the cartel be able to
“exploit” anyone? In the first place, consumers
could not be “exploited.” For consumers’
demand curves would still be elastic or inelastic, as the case may be.
Since, as we shall see further below, consumers’ demand
curves for a firm are always elastic above the free-market equilibrium
price, it follows that the cartel will not be able to raise prices or
earn more from consumers.
What about
the factors? Could not their owners be exploited by
the cartel? In the first place, the universal cartel, to be
effective, would have to include owners of primary land;
otherwise whatever gains they might have might be imputed to land. To
put it in its strongest terms, then, could a universal cartel of all
land and capital goods
“exploit” laborers by systematically
paying the latter less than their discounted marginal value
products? Could not the members of the cartel agree to pay a very low
sum to these workers? If that happened, however, there would be created
great opportunities for entrepreneurs either to spring up outside the
cartel or to break away from the cartel and profit by hiring workers
for a higher wage. This competition would have the double effect of (a)
breaking up the universal cartel and (b) tending
again to yield to the laborers their marginal product. As long as
competition is free, unhampered by governmental restrictions,
no universal cartel could either exploit labor or remain universal for
any length of time.
3. The Illusion of Monopoly
Price
So far we
have established that there is nothing “wrong” with
a monopoly price, either when instituted by one firm or by a cartel;
that, in fact, whatever price the free market (unhampered by violence
or the threat of violence) establishes will be the
“best” price. We have also shown the impossibility
of separating “monopolizing” from
efficiency considerations in cartel actions or of separating technology
from profitability in general; and we have seen the great instability
of the cartel form.
In this
section we investigate a further problem: Granted that there is nothing
“wrong” with monopoly prices, how tenable is the
very concept of “monopoly price” on the free
market? Can it be distinguished at all from “competitive
price,” its supposed polar opposite? To answer this question,
we must explore what the theory of monopoly price is all about.
A. Definitions of Monopoly
Before
investigating the theory of monopoly price, we must begin by defining monopoly.
Despite the fact that monopoly problems occupy an enormous
quantity of economic writings, little or no clarity of definition
exists.
There is,
in fact, enormous vagueness and confusion on the subject. Very few
economists have formulated a coherent, meaningful definition of
monopoly.
A common
example of a confused definition is: “Monopoly exists when a
firm has control over its price.” This definition is a
mixture of confusion and absurdity. In the first place, on the free
market there is no such thing as “control” over the
price in an exchange; in any exchange the price of the sale is voluntarily
agreed upon by both parties. No “control” is
exercised by either party; the only control is each person’s
control over his own
actions—stemming from his
self-sovereignty—and consequently his control will be over
his own decision to enter or not to enter into an exchange at any
hypothetical price. There is no direct control over price because price
is a mutual phenomenon. On the other hand, each
person has absolute control over his own action and
therefore over the price which he will attempt to
charge for any particular good. Any man can set any price that he wants
for any quantity of a good that he sells; the question is whether he
can find any buyers at that price. Similarly, of course, any buyer can
set any price at which he will purchase a certain good; the
question is whether he can find a seller at that price. It is
this process, indeed, of mutual bids and offers that yields the daily
prices on the market.
There is
an all-too-common assumption, however, that if we compare, say, Henry
Ford and a small wheat farmer, the two differ enormously in their
respective powers of control. It is believed that the wheat
farmer finds his price “given” to him by the
market, while Ford can “administer” or
“set his own” price. The wheat farmer is allegedly
subject to the impersonal forces of the market, and ultimately to the
consumer, while Ford is, to a greater or lesser extent, the master of
his own fate, if not indeed the ruler of the consumers. Further, it is
believed that Ford’s “monopoly power”
stems from his being “large” in relation to the
automobile market, while the farmer is a “pure
competitor” because he is “small”
compared to the total supply of wheat. Usually, Ford is not considered
an “absolute’‘ monopolist, but someone
with a vague “degree of monopoly power.”
In the
first place, it is completely false to say that the farmer and Ford
differ in their control over price. Both have exactly the same degree
of control and of noncontrol: i.e., both have absolute control
over the quantity they produce and the price which they attempt to get;
and
absolute noncontrol over the
price-and-quantity transaction that finally takes place. The
farmer is free to ask any price he wants, just as Ford is, and is free
to look for a buyer at such a price. He is not in the least compelled
to sell his produce to the organized “markets” if
he can do better elsewhere. Every producer of every product is
free, in a free-market society, to produce as much as he wants of
whatever he possesses or can purchase and to try to sell it, at
whatever price he can get, to anyone he can find.Naturally, every
seller, as we have repeatedly stated, will attempt to sell his produce
for the highest possible price; similarly, every buyer will attempt to
purchase goods at the lowest possible price. It is precisely the
voluntary interaction of these buyers and sellers that establishes the
entire supply and demand structure for consumers’ and
producers’ goods. To accuse Ford or a waterworks or any other
producer of “charging whatever the traffic will
bear” and to take this as a sign of monopoly is pure
nonsense, for this is precisely the action of everyone in the economy:
the small wheat farmer, the laborer, the landowner, etc.
“Charging whatever the traffic will bear” is simply
a rather emotive synonym for charging as high a price as can be freely
obtained.
Who
officially “sets” the price in any exchange is a
completely trivial and irrelevant technological question—a
matter of institutional convenience rather than economic
analysis. The fact that Macy’s posts its prices each day does
not mean that Macy’s has some sort of mysterious
“control” of its price over the consumer;
similarly,
that large-scale industrial buyers of raw materials often post
their bid prices does not mean that they exercise some sort of extra
control over the price obtained by the growers. Rather than acting as a
means of control, in fact, posting simply furnishes needed information
to all would-be buyers and/or sellers. The process of price
determination through the interaction of value scales occurs in
precisely the same way regardless of the concrete details and
institutional conditions of market arrangements.
Each
individual producer, then, is sovereign over his own actions;
he is free to buy, produce, and sell whatever he likes and to whoever
will purchase. The farmer is not compelled to sell to any particular
market or to any particular company, any more than Ford is compelled to
sell to John Brown if he does not wish to do so (say, because he can
get a higher price elsewhere). But, as we have seen, in so far as a
producer wishes to maximize his monetary return, he does submit himself
to the control of consumers, and he sets his output accordingly. This
is true of the farmer, of Ford, or of anyone else in the entire
economy—landowner, laborer, service-producer,
product-owner, etc. Ford, then, has no more
“control” over the consumer than the farmer has.
One common
objection is that Ford is able to acquire “monopoly
power” or “monopolistic power” because
his product has a recognized brand name or trade-mark, which the wheat
farmer has not. This, however, is surely a case of putting the cart
before the horse. The brand name and the wide knowledge of the brand
come from consumers’ desire for the product attached to that
particular brand and are therefore a result of
consumer demand rather than a pre-existing means for some sort of
“monopolistic power” over the consumers. In fact,
farmer Hiram Jones is perfectly free to stamp the brand name
“Hiram Jones Wheat” on his product and attempt to
sell it on the market. The fact that he has not done so signifies that
it would not be a profitable step in the concrete market condition of
his product. The chief point is that in some cases consumers and
lower-order entrepreneurs consider each individual brand name as
representing a unique product, while in other cases
purchasers consider the output of one firm—one product-owner
or set of product-owners operating jointly—as identical in
use-value with products of other firms. Which situation will occur is
entirely dependent on the buyers’ valuations in each concrete
case.
Later in
this chapter we shall analyze in greater detail the tangled web of
fallacies involved in the various theories of
“monopolistic competition”; at this point
we are attempting to arrive at a definition of monopoly per se.
To proceed: There are three possible coherent definitions of monopoly.
One is derived from its linguistic roots: monos
(only) and polein (to sell), i.e., the
only seller of any given good (definition 1). This is
certainly a legitimate definition, but it is an
extraordinarily broad one. It means that, whenever there is any
differentiation at all among individual products, the individual
producer and seller is a “monopolist.” John Jones,
lawyer, is a “monopolist” over the legal services
of John Jones; Tom Williams, doctor, is a
“monopolist” over his own unique medical services,
etc. The owner of the Empire State Building is a
“monopolist” over the rental services in his
building. This definition, therefore, labels all consumer distinctions
between individual products as establishing
“monopolies.”
It must be
remembered that only consumers can decide whether
two commodities offered on the market are one good or two
different goods. This issue cannot be settled by a physical
inspection of the product. The elemental physical nature of the good
may be only one of its properties; in most cases, a
brand name, the “good will” of a particular
company, or a more pleasant atmosphere in the store will differentiate
the product from its rivals in the view of many of its customers. The
products then become different goods for the
consumers. No one can ever be certain in advance—least of all
the economist—whether a commodity sold by A will be treated
on the market as homogeneous with the same basic physical good
sold by B.
Hence,
there is hardly any way that definition 1 of
“monopoly” can be successfully used. For this
definition depends on how we choose a “homogeneous
good,” and this can never be decided by an economist. What
constitutes a homogeneous commodity” (i.e., an
industry)—neckties, bow ties, bow ties with polka dots, etc.,
or bow ties made by Jones? Only consumers will decide, and they, as
different consumers, will be likely to decide differently in each
concrete case. Use of definition 1, therefore, will probably reduce to
the barren definition of monopoly as each man’s
exclusive ownership of his own property—and
this, absurdly, would make every single person a monopolist!
Definition
1, then, is coherent, but highly inexpedient. Its usefulness
is very limited, and the term has acquired highly charged emotional
connotations from past use of quite different definitions. For
reasons detailed below, the term “monopoly” has
sinister and evil connotations to most people.
“Monopolist” is generally a word of abuse;
to apply the term “monopolist” to at least the vast
majority of the population and perhaps to every man would have a
confusing and even ludicrous effect.
The second
definition is related to the first, but differs very significantly. It,
in fact, was the original definition of monopoly
and the very definition responsible for its sinister connotations in
the public mind. Let us turn to its classic expression by the great
seventeenth-century jurist, Lord Coke:
A monopoly is an institution or allowance by the
king, by his grant, commission, or otherwise . . . to any person or
persons, bodies politic or corporate, for the sole
buying, selling, making, working, or using of anything, whereby any
person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are sought to
be restrained of any freedom or liberty that they had before, or
hindered in their lawful trade.
In other words, by this definition, monopoly
is a grant of special privilege by the State, reserving a
certain area of production to one particular individual or group.
Entry into the field is prohibited to others and this prohibition is
enforced by the gendarmes of the State.
This
definition of monopoly goes back to the common law and acquired great
political importance in England during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, when an historic struggle took place between
libertarians and the Crown over the issue of monopoly as
opposed to freedom of production and enterprise. Under this
definition of the term, it is not surprising that
“monopoly” took on connotations of
sinister interest and tyranny in the public mind. The enormous
restrictions on production and trade, as well as the establishment by
the State of a monopoly caste of favorites, were the objects of
vehement attack for several centuries.
That this
definition was formerly important in economic analysis is
clear in the following quotation from one of the first
American economists, Francis Wayland:
A monopoly is an exclusive right granted to a man,
or to a monopoly of men, to employ their labor or capital in some
particular manner.
It is
obvious that this type of monopoly can never arise
on a free market, unhampered by State interference. In the free
economy, then, according to this definition, there can be no
“monopoly problem.”
Many
writers have objected that brand names and trade-marks, generally
considered as part of the free market, really constitute grants of
special privilege by the State. No other firm can
“compete” with Hershey chocolates by producing its
own product and calling it Hershey chocolates.
Is this
not a State-imposed restriction on freedom of entry? And how can there
be “real” freedom of entry under such conditions?
This
argument, however, completely misconceives the nature of liberty and of
property. Every individual in the free society has a right to ownership
of his own self and to the exclusive use of his own
property. Included in his property is his name, the
linguistic label which is uniquely his and is identified with him. A
name is an essential part of a man’s identity and therefore
of his property. To say that he is a “monopolist”
over his name is saying no more than that he is a
“monopolist” over his own will or property, and
such an extension of the word “monopolist” to every
individual in the world would be an absurd usage of the term. The
“governmental” function of defense of person and
property, vital to the existence of a free society so long as any
people are disposed to invade them, involves the defense of each
person’s particular name or trade-mark against the fraud of forgery
or imposture. It means the outlawing of John
Smith’s pretending to be Joseph Williams, a
prominent lawyer, and selling his own legal advice after stating to
clients that he is selling that of Williams. This fraud is not only
implicit theft of the consumer, but it is also abusing the
property right of Joseph Williams to his unique name and
individuality. And the use by some other chocolate firm of the Hershey
label would be an equivalent perpetration of an invasive act of fraud
and forgery.
Before
adopting this definition of monopoly as the proper one, we must
consider a final alternative: the defining of a monopolist as a
person who has achieved a monopoly price (definition 3). This
definition has never been explicitly set forth, but it has been
implicit in the most worthwhile of the neoclassical writings on this
subject. It has the merit of focusing attention on the
important economic question of monopoly price, its nature and
consequences. In this connection, we shall now investigate the
neoclassical theory of monopoly price and inquire whether it really has
the substance it seems at first glance to possess.
B. The Neoclassical Theory of Monopoly Price
In
previous sections we have refereed to a monopoly price as one
established either by a monopolist or by a cartel of
producers. At this point we must investigate the theory more
closely. A succinct definition of monopoly price has been supplied by
Mises:
If conditions are such that the monopolist can
secure higher net proceeds by selling a smaller quantity of his product
at a higher price than by selling a greater quantity of his supply at a
lower price, there emerges a monopoly price higher
than the potential market price would have been in the absence of
monopoly.
The
monopoly price doctrine may be summed up as follows: A certain quantity
of a good, when produced and sold, yields a competitive price
on the market. A monopolist or a cartel of firms can, if the
demand curve is inelastic at the competitive-price point,
restrict sales and raise the price, to arrive at the point of maximum
returns. If, on the other hand, the demand curve as it presents itself
to the monopolist or cartel is elastic at the
competitive-price point, the monopolist will not restrict
sales to attain a higher price. As a result, as Mises points out, there
is no need to be concerned with the “monopolist”
(in the sense of definition 1 above); whether or not he is the sole
producer of a commodity is unimportant and irrelevant for catallactic
problems. It becomes important only if the configuration of his demand
curve enables him to restrict sales and achieve a higher income at a
monopoly price.
If he
learns about the inelastic demand curve after he
has erroneously produced too great a stock, he must destroy or
withhold part of his stock; after that, he restricts
production of the commodity to the most remunerative level.
The
monopoly price analysis is portrayed in the diagram in Figure 67. The
basic assumption, usually only implicit, is that there is some
identifiable stock, say 0A, and some identifiable
market price, say, AC, which will result from competitive
conditions. AB then represents the stock line under
“competition.” Then, according to the theory, if
the demand curve is elastic above this price, there
will be no occasion to restrict sales and obtain a higher, or
“monopoly,” price. Such a demand curve is DD.
On the other hand, if the demand curve is inelastic above the
competitive-price point, as in D'D',
it will pay the monopolist to restrict sales to, say, 0A' (stock
line represented by A'B') and achieve a
monopoly price, A'M.
This would yield the maximum monetary income for the monopolist.

The
inelastic demand curve, giving rise to an opportunity to monopolize,
may present itself either to a single monopolist of a given product or
to “an industry as a whole” when organized into a
cartel of the different producers. In the latter case, the
demand curve, as it presents itself to each firm, is elastic.
At the competitive price, if one firm raises its price, the customers
preponderantly shift to purchasing from its competitors. On the other
hand, if the firms are cartelized, in many cases the lesser range of
substitution by consumers would render the demand curve, as
presented to the cartel, inelastic. This condition serves as
the impetus to the formation of the cartels studied above.
As
Professor Benham states:
Firms which have produced a relatively large share
of output in the past will demand the same share in the future. Firms
which are expanding—owing, for example, to an unusually
efficient management—will demand a larger share than they
obtained in the past. Firms with a greater
“capacity” for producing, as measured by the size
of their . . . plant will demand a correspondingly greater share.
(Benham, Economics, p. 232)
On the difficulties faced by cartels, see
also Bjarke Fog, “How Are Cartel Prices
Determined?” Journal of Industrial Economics,
November, 1956, pp. 16–23; Donald Dewey, Monopoly
in Economics and Law (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1959), pp.
14–24; and Wieser, Social Economics, p.
225.
For illustrations
of this instability in the history of cartels, see
Fairchild, Furniss, and Buck, Elementary Economics,
II, 54–55; Charles Norman Fay, Too Much Government,
Too Much Taxation (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1923),
p. 41, and Big Business and Government (New York:
Doubleday, Page, 1912); A.D.H. Kaplan, Big Enterprise in a
Competitive System (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institute, 1954), pp. 11–12.
These terms will
be explained below.
]Clearly, the very
term “equal” is unusable here. What does it mean to
say that lawyer Jones’ ability is “equal”
to teacher Smith’s?
From his Address
to the Civic Federation Conference on Trusts, held in Chicago,
September 13–16, 1899, Chicago Conference on Trusts
(Chicago, 1900), pp. 253–54, reprinted in Benjamin
R. Tucker, Individual Liberty (New York: Vanguard
Press, 1926), pp. 248–57. Said a lawyer at the conference:
The control of prices can be brought about
permanently only by such a superiority in the methods of
manufacture as will successfully defy competition. Any price
established by a combination which enables competitors to make
a reasonable profit will soon encourage such competition as will reduce
the price. (Azel F. Hatch, Chicago Conference, p.
70)
See also the excellent article by A. Leo Weil, ibid.,
pp. 77–96; and W.P. Potter, ibid., pp.
299–305: F.B. Thurber, ibid., pp.
124–36; Horatio W. Seymour, ibid., pp.
188–93; J. Sterling Morton, ibid., pp.
225–30.
Does our
discussion imply, as Dorfman has charged (J. Dorfman, Economic
Mind in American Civilization, III, 247), that
“whatever is, is right”? We cannot enter into a
discussion of the relation of economics to ethics at this
point, but we can state briefly that our answer, pertaining to the free
market, is a qualified Yes. Specifically, our statement would be: Given
the ends on the value scales of individuals, as revealed by
their real actions, the maximum satisfaction of those ends for every
person is achieved only on the free market. Whether individuals have
the “proper” ends or not is another question
entirely and cannot be decided by economics.
If all the factors
and resources are absolutely controlled by the
State, it makes little difference if, legally, the State owns
these resources. For ownership connotes control, and if the nominal
owner is coercively deprived of control, it is the controller
who is the real owner of the resource.
The only author,
to our knowledge, that looks forward to One (voluntary) Big
Cartel as a potential ideal is Heath, Citadel, Market, and
Altar, pp. 184–87.
Cf. Mises, Human
Action, p. 592.
The
same confusion exists in the laws concerning monopoly. Despite
constitutional warnings against vagueness, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
outlaws “monopolizing” actions without once
defining the concept. To this day there has been no clear legislative
decision concerning what constitutes illegal monopolistic action.
We are, of course,
not considering here particular uncertainties of agriculture resulting
from climate, etc.
For further
discussion, see Murray N. Rothbard, “The
Bogey of Administered Prices,” The Freeman,
September, 1959, pp. 39–41.
On the
contrary, the consumers control Macy’s to the extent that the
store desires monetary income. Cf. John W. Scoville and Noel Sargent,
eds., Fact and Fancy in the T.N.E.C. Monographs
(New York: National Association of Manufacturers, 1942), p.
312.
One reason often
given for ascribing “control over price” to Ford
and not the small wheat grower is that Ford is so large that his
actions affect the market price of his product, while the farmer is so
small that his actions do not affect the price. On this, see the
critique below of “monopolistic competition”
theories.
Economists have
often charged, for example, that consumers who will pay a higher price
for the same good at a store with a more pleasant atmosphere are acting
“irrationally.” Actually, they are by no means
doing so, since consumers are buying not just a physical can of beans,
but a can of beans sold in a certain store by certain clerks, and these
factors may (or may not) make a difference to them. Businessmen are far
less motivated by such “nonphysical” considerations
(although good will affects their purchases too), not
because they are “more rational” than consumers,
but because they are not concerned, as consumers are, with their own
value scales in deciding their purchases. As we have seen above,
businessmen are generally motivated purely by the expected revenue that
goods will bring on the market. For an excellent treatment of
the definition of “homogeneous product,” see
G. Warren Nutter, “The Plateau Demand Curve and
Utility Theory,” Journal of Political
Economy, December, 1955, pp. 526–28. Also
see Alex Hunter, “Product Differentiation and
Welfare Economics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
November, 1955, pp. 533–52.
Professor Lawrence
Abbott, in one of the outstanding theoretical works of recent years,
demonstrates also that as civilization and the economy advance,
products will become more and more differentiated and less and less
homogeneous. For one thing, greater differentiation occurs at the
consumer than at the producer level, and the expanding economy takes
over an increasing proportion of goods once made by the
consumer himself and therefore supplies more finished goods
than raw materials to the consumer than formerly (bread rather than
flour, sweaters rather than wool yarn, etc.). Thus, there is greater
opportunity for differentiation.
Furthermore, to the familiar charge that business advertising tends to
create differentiation in the consumer’s mind that is not
“really” there, Abbott replies incisively that the reverse
is more likely to be true and that advancing civilization increases the
consumer’s perception and discrimination of differences of
which he was previously ignorant. Writes Abbott:
as man becomes more civilized, he develops greater
powers of perception with regard to quality differences.
Subjective homogeneity may exist even when objective
homogeneity does not, due to the inability or unwillingness of buyers
to perceive differences between almost identical products and
discriminate between them. . . . As a society matures and education
improves, people learn to develop more acute powers of discrimination.
Their wants become more detailed. They begin . . . to develop
a preference, say, not simply for white wine, but for 1948 Chablis. . .
. People generally tend to underestimate the significance of
apparently trivial differences in fields in which they are not expert.
An unmusical person may be unwilling to concede that there is any
difference in tone between a Steinway and a Chickering piano, being
unable himself to detect it. A nongolfer is more likely than a habitual
player to believe that all brands of golf balls are virtually alike.
(Lawrence Abbott, Quality and Competition [New
York: Columbia University Press, 1955], pp. 18–19, and chap.
I)
Also see ibid., pp.
45–46 and Edward H. Chamberlin, “Product
Heterogeneity and Public Policy” in Towards
a More General Theory of Value (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1957), p. 96.
Oddly, despite the
reams of literature on monopolies, very few economists have bothered to
define monopoly, and these problems have therefore
been overlooked. Mrs. Robinson, in the beginning of her famous Economics
of Imperfect Competition, saw the difficulty and then evaded
the issue throughout the rest of the book. She concedes that under
careful analysis either a monopoly would be defined as every
producer’s control over his own product or monopoly could
simply not exist on the free market at all. For competition exists
among all products for the consumer’s dollar, while
very few articles are rigorously homogeneous. Mrs. Robinson then tries
to evade the issue by falling back on “common
sense” and defining monopoly as existing where there is a
“marked gap” between the product and other
substitutes the consumer may buy. But this will not do. Economics, in
the first place, can establish no quantitative laws, so that there is
nothing we can say about sizes of gaps. When does the gap become
“marked”? Secondly, even if such
“laws” were meaningful, there would be no way to
measure the cross-elasticities of demands, the elasticity of
substitution between the products, etc. These elasticities of
substitution are changing all the time and could not be measured
successfully even if they all remained constant, since supply
conditions are always changing. No laboratory exists where all economic
factors may be held fixed. After this point in her discussion, Mrs.
Robinson practically forgets all about heterogeneity of product. Joan
Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition
(London: Macmillan & Co., 1933), pp. 4–6.
Also cf. Hunter, “Product Differentiation and Welfare
Economics,” pp. 547ff.
Quoted in Richard
T. Ely and others, Outlines of Economics (3rd ed.;
New York: Macmillan & Co., 1917), pp. 190–91.
Blackstone gave almost the same definition and called monopoly a
“license or privilege allowed by the king.” Also
see A. Leo Weil, Chicago Conference, p.
86.
The onrush of
monopoly grants by Queen Elizabeth I and Charles I provoked resistance
from even the Crown’s subservient judges, and, in 1624,
Parliament declared that “all monopolies are altogether
contrary to the laws of this realm and are and shall be
void.” This antimonopoly spirit was deeply ingrained in
America, and the original Maryland constitution declared that
monopolies were “odious” and “contrary to
. . . principles of commerce.” Ely, Outlines of
Economics, pp. 191–92. Also see
Francis A. Walker, Political Economy (New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 1911), pp. 483–84.
Francis Wayland, The
Elements of Political Economy (Boston: Gould
& Lincoln, 1854), p. 116. Cf. this later definition by Arthur
Latham Perry: “A monopoly, as the derivation of the word
implies, is a restriction imposed by a government upon the sale of
certain services.” Perry, Political Economy,
p. 190. In recent years this definition has all but died out. A rare
current example is: “Monopoly exists when government by its
coercive power limits to a particular person or organization, or
combination of them, the right to sell particular goods or services. .
. . It is an infringement of the right to make a living.”
Heath, Citadel, Market, and Altar, p. 237.
As Weil
stated: “Monopolies cannot be created by association or
agreement. We now have no letters patent giving exclusive right. . . .
It is therefore wholly unjustifiable to use the term monopoly as
applied to the effects of industrial consolidation.” Weil, Chicago
Conference, pp. 86f.
For example,
Edward H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition
(7th ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 57ff., 270ff.
It might be
objected that these concepts are vague and give rise to
problems. Problems do arise, but they are not insuperable.
Thus, if one man is named Joseph Williams, does this preclude anyone
else from having the same name, and is any future Joseph
Williams to be considered a criminal? The answer is clearly: No, so
long as there is no attempt by one to impersonate the other. In short,
it is not so much the name per se which an
individual owns, but the name as an affiliate of his person.
For clear
expositions of the theory of monopoly price, see
Mises, Socialism, pp. 385–92, and Human
Action, pp. 278, 354–84; Menger, Principles
of Economics, pp. 207–25; Fetter, Economic
Principles, pp. 73–85, 381–85; Harry
Gunnison Brown, “Competitive and Monopolistic
Price-Making,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
XXII (1908), pp. 626–39; and Wieser, Social
Economics, pp. 204, 211–12. In this particular
case, “neoclassical” includes
“Austrian.“
Mises, Human
Action, p. 278.
Thus:
The mere existence of monopoly does not mean
anything. The publisher of a copyright book is a monopolist. But he may
not be able to sell a single copy, no matter how low the price he asks.
Not every price at which a monopolist sells a monopolized commodity is
a monopoly price. Monopoly prices are only prices at which it
is more advantageous for the monopolist to restrict the total amount to
be sold than to expand sales to the limit which a competitive market
would allow. (Mises, Human Action, p. 356)
Here we abstract
from monetary expense or “money cost”
considerations. When the producer is considering sale of already
produced stock, such past monetary expenses are completely
irrelevant. When he is considering present and future
production for future sale, present money-cost considerations
become important, and the producer strives for maximum net
returns. At any rate, some A¢
point will be set, whatever the actual configuration of money costs,
unless, indeed, average money costs are falling rapidly enough in this
region to make the “competitive point” the
most remunerative after all. It is curious that it is
precisely the condition of falling average cost that has given
the most worry to antimonopoly writers, who have been concerned that
one given firm in any industry might grow to
“monopoly” size because of this condition. And yet,
if it is “monopoly price,” not monopoly, that is
particularly important, such worry is clearly unfounded. On the
general unimportance of cost considerations in monopoly
theory, see Chamberlin, Theory of
Monopolistic Competition, pp. 193–94.
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