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Amidst the near-universal hoopla for President
Bush's massive intervention into the
Arabian Peninsula, a few sober observers have pointed out the curious
lack of clarity in Mr.
Bush's strategic objective: is it to defend Saudi Arabia (and is that
kingdom really under attack?);
to kick Iraq out of Kuwait; to restore what Bush has oddly referred to
as the "legitimate
government" of Kuwait (made "legitimate" by what process?); to depose
or murder Saddam
Hussein (and to replace him with whom or what?); or to carpet-bomb Iraq
back to the Stone
Age?
There has been even less discussion, however, about
a somewhat different even more
puzzling question: why, exactly, are we suddenly hip-deep into Saudi
Arabia? Why the hysteria?
Why the most massive military buildup since Vietnam, and the placing of
almost our entire army,
air force, navy, marines, and a chunk of reserves in this one spot on
the globe where there is not
even a U.S. treaty obligation?
(1) Big guy, little guy. What is puzzling to some
of us is crystal clear to General H.
Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. forces in "Operation Desert
Shield." Growing testy
under media questioning, the general replied: "Don't you read the
papers? You all know why
we're here. A big guy beat up a little guy and we're here to stop it."
The general was obviously using the Police Action
metaphor. A big guy is beating up a
little guy, and the cop on the corner intervenes to put a stop to the
aggression.
Unfortunately, on further analysis, the Police
Action metaphor raises far more questions
than it answers. Aside from the obvious problem: why is the U.S. the
self-appointed international
cop? The cops, seeing the bad guy flee and lose himself in his
neighborhood, do not surround
that neighborhood with massive force and starve out the entire
neighborhood looking for the bad
guy. Still less do cops carpet-bomb the area hoping the bad guy is
killed in the process. Cops
operate on the crucial principle that innocent civilians do not get
killed or targeted in the course
of trying to apprehend the guilty.
Another crucial point: governments are not akin to
individuals. If a big guy sets upon a
little guy, the aggressor is invading his victim's right to his person
and to his property. But
governments cannot be assumed to be innocent individuals possessing
just property rights in their
territory. Government boundaries are not productive acquisitions, as is
private property. They are
almost always the result of previous aggressions and coercion by
governments on both sides. We
cannot assume that every existing state has
the absolute right to "own" or control all the
territory within its generally arbitrary borders.
Another problem with the alleged principle of the
U.S. cop defending all borders,
especially those of little states: what about the big U.S. government's
own invasion of decidedly
little Panama only a short time ago? Who gets to put the manacles on
the U.S.? The usual retort
was that the U.S. was "restoring" free elections in Panama. An odd way
to justify intervention
against Iraq, however, since Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are each
absolutist royal oligarchies that
are at the furtherest possible pole from "democracy" or "free
elections."
(2) Saddam Hussein is a very bad man, the "Butcher
of Baghdad." Absolutely, but he was
just as much a butcher only the other day when he was our gallant ally
against the terrible threat
posed to the Gulf by the fanatical Shiites of Iran. The fanatical
Shiites are still there, by the way,
but they--as well as the Dictator of Syria, Hafez Assad, the Butcher of
Hama--seem to have been
magically transformed into our gallant allies against Saddam Hussein.
(3) But some day (three but more likely ten years)
Saddam Hussein may acquire nuclear
weapons. So what? The U.S. has nuclear weapons galore, the result of
its late Cold War with the
U.S.S.R., which also has a lot of nuclear weapons, and had them during
the decades that they
were our Implacable Enemy. So why is there far more hysteria now
against Saddam than there
ever was against the Soviet Union? Besides, Israel has had nuclear
weapons for a long time, and
India and Pakistan are at the point of war over Kashmir, and they each
have nuclear arms. So
why don't we worry about them?
The appeal to high principle is not going to
succeed as a coherent explanation for the
American intervention. Many observers, therefore, have zeroed in on
economics as the
explanation.
(4) The Oil War. Saddam, by invading Kuwait and
threatening the rest of Arabia, poses
the danger, as one media person put it, of being "king of the world's
oil." But the oil explanation
has invariably been posed as the U.S. defending the American consumer
against an astronomical
raising of oil prices by Iraq.
Again, however, there are many problems with the
Oil Price explanation. The same
Establishment that now worries about higher oil prices as a "threat to
the American way of life,"
treated OPEC's
quadrupling of oil prices in the early 1970s when we were far more
dependent on Gulf oil than we are now, with calm and fortitude. Why was
there no U.S. invasion
of Saudi Arabia then to lower the price of oil? If there is so much
concern for the consumer, why
do so many politicians long to slap a huge 50 cents a gallon tax on the
price gasoline?
Indeeed, it is clear that the power of OPEC, like
all cartels, is strictly limited by consumer
demand, and that its power to raise the price of oil is far less than
in the 1970s. Best estimates are
that Saddam Hussein, even conquering the entire Gulf, could not raise
the oil price above $25 a
barrel. But the U.S., by its embargo, blockade, and continuing threats
of war, has already
managed to raise the price of crude to $40 a barrel!
In fact, it would be more plausible to suppose that
the aim of the massive Bush
intervention has been to raise the price of oil, not to lower it. And
considering Mr. Bush's vice
presidential visit to Saudi Arabia specifically to urge them to raise
prices, his long-time
connections with Texas oil and with Big Oil generally, as well as
Texas's slump in recent years,
this hunch begins to look all too credible.
But the likeliest explanation for the Bush
intervention has not been raised at all. This
view focuses not on the price of oil, but on its supply, and
specifically on the profits to be made
from that supply. For surely, as Joe Sobran has emphasized, Saddam does
not intend to control
oil in order to destroy either its supply or the world's customers whom
he hopes will purchase
that oil.
The Rockefeller interest and other Western Big Oil
companies have had intimate ties with
the absolute royalties of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia ever since the 1930s.
During that decade and
World War II, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia granted a monopoly
concession on all oil under his
domain to the Rockefeller-control-led Aramco, while the $30 million in
royalty payments for the
concession was paid by the U.S. taxpayer.
The Rockefeller-influenced U.S. Export-Import Bank
obligingly paid another $25 million
to Ibn Saud to construct a pleasure railroad from his main palace, and
President Roosevelt made
a secret appropriation out of war funds of $165 million to Aramco for
pipeline construction
across Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the U.S.
Army was obligingly assigned to build an
airfield and military base at Dhahran, near the Aramco Oilfields, after
which the multi-million
dollar base was turned over, gratis, to Ibn Saud.
It is true that Aramco was gradually "nationalized"
by the Saudi monarchy during the
1970s, but that amounts merely to a shift in the terms of this cozy
partnership: over half of Saudi
oil is still turned over to the old Aramco consortium as management
corporation for sale to the
outside world. Plus Rockefeller's Mobil Oil, in addition to being a key
part of Aramco, is
engaged in two huge joint ventures with the Saudi government: an oil
refinery and a
petrochemical complex costing more than $1 billion each.
Oil pipelines and refineries have to be
constructed, and Standard Oil of California (now
Chevron), part of Aramco, brought in its longtime associate, Bechtel,
from the beginning in
Saudi Arabia to perform construction. The well-connected Bechtel (which
has provided cabinet
secretaries George Schultz and Casper Weinberger to the federal
government) is now busily
building Jubail, a new $20 billion industrial city on the Persian Gulf,
as well as several other
large projects in Saudi Arabia.
As for Kuwait, its emir granted a monopoly oil
concession to Kuwait Oil Co., a
partnership of Gulf Oil and British Petroleum, in the 1930s, and by now
Kuwait's immensely
wealthy ruling Sabah family owns a large chunk of British Petroleum,
and also keeps enormous
and most welcome deposits at Rockefeller-oriented Chase Manhattan and
Citibank.
Iraq, on the other hand, has long been a rogue oil
country, in the sense of being outside
the Rockefeller-Wall Street ambit. Thus, when the crisis struck on
August 2, the big Wall Street
banks, including Chase and Citibank, told reporters that they had
virtually no loans outstanding,
nor deposits owed, to Iraq.
Hence, it may well be that Mr. Bush's war is an oil
war all right, but not in the sense of a
heroic battle on behalf of cheap oil for the American consumer. George
Bush, before he ascended
to the vice presidency, was a member of the executive committee of
David Rockefeller's
powerful Trilateral Commission. Mr. Bush's own oil exploration company,
Zapata, was funded
by the Rockefeller family. So this Oil War may instead be a
less-than-noble effort on behalf of
Rockefeller control of Middle East.
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